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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below rule correctly in determining that officer Ross 
was acting within the course of her employment while returning home from work in 
a patrol vehicle provided to her by her employer? 
2. Can the ruling of the Court below be sustained on the alternative 
ground that officer Ross was acting within the course of her employment because 
she was on a special errand for her employer? 
The decision to grant summary judgment is given no deference and is 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Greene v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2001 UT 
109. 
STATEMENT OF DISPOSITIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or 
regulations which are dispositive of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs do not take issue with the City's statement of the general nature 
of the case, but would supplement its statement of facts with the addition of the 
following: 
1 
1. Officer Ross was paid for three hours work on the day of the 
accident even though the meeting she attended lasted only about one hour. 
Deposition of Michelle Ross, R.72. 
2. Officer Ross had received permission from her employer to bring 
her child to the meeting she attended. Deposition of Michelle Ross, R. 72. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
At the time of the accident giving rise to this action, Salt Lake City police 
officer Michelle Ross was returning to her home in Tooele from a work meeting in 
Salt Lake she had been required to attend on her scheduled day off. She was 
driving a Salt Lake City patrol vehicle she was allowed to use to drive to and from 
work as a part of the City's take home vehicle program. 
Ms. Ross was acting within the course and scope of her employment at 
the time of the accident because she qualifies for two of the recognized exceptions to 
the general rule that an employee's journey to and from work is not considered to be 
within the course of employment. First, as she was using a vehicle provided to her 
by her employer for their mutual benefit, she was within the exception to the 
coming and going rule applicable to employees utilizing employer provided 
transportation. 
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Second, because her trip was a special errand undertaken at her 
employer's request, she was within the course of employment at all times from the 
beginning of her trip until she had arrived back at home. 
The City's contention that the Court below used the wrong test to 
determine if officer Ross was acting within the scope of employment is in error. 
The test referred to by the City is one for determining if specific conduct of an 
employee constitutes work for her employer, not whether the journey to and from 
that work is also within the course of employment. As the City has always admitted 
that officer Ross1 attendance at the meeting constituted a service within the course 
of her employment, the test urged by the City has no application in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. HAVING PROVIDED OFFICER ROSS WITH 
A VEHICLE IN WHICH TO TRAVEL TO AND 
FROM WORK, THE CITY IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE 
FOR HER NEGLIGENT ACTS DURING SUCH TRAVEL. 
The City's assertion that the employer provided transportation exception 
to the going and coming rule only applies when an employee is required to use 
employer provided transportation has no support in law. As noted by Prof. Larson 
in his treatise: 
in the majority of cases involving a deliberate and 
substantial payment for the expense of travel, or the 
provision of an automobile under the employee's 
3 
control, the journey is held to be in the course of 
employment. 
A. Larson, Workers' Compensation §14.07[2] at pg. 14-16 (Desk Ed. 2001). 
Indeed, this exception is so widely recognized that one court has referred 
to it as being as well established as the rule itself. 
It is settled that a workman injured going to or 
coming from the place of work is not in the course of 
employment. There is an exception, however, as 
well established as the rule itself. The exception, 
which is supported by overwhelming authority, is 
this: When a workman is so injured while being 
transported in a vehicle furnished by his employer as 
an incident of the employment, he is within the 
course of employment, as contemplated by the act. 
In other words, when the vehicle is supplied by the 
employer for the mutual benefit of himself and the 
workman to facilitate the progress of the work, the 
employment begins when the workmen enters the 
vehicle and ends when he leaves it on termination of 
his labor. 
Eickhornv. Boatright. 467 S.E.2d 214, 216 (GA. App. 1996). 
It is this well established exception which this Court recognized as a 
limitation of the coming and going rule in State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 
685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984), when it noted that an injury is within the scope 
of employment "where transportation was furnished by the employer to benefit the 
employer . . . " 
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Contrary to the City's suggestion, the coming and going rule of worker's 
compensation jurisprudence is fully applicable to negligence actions. 
Having previously adopted the "coming and going 
rule" in worker's compensation cases, we here extend 
the principle to cases involving third-party negligence 
actions . . . 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1989). 
As there is no question that officer Ross was traveling home from work in 
a City furnished vehicle at the time of the accident in question, the sole remaining 
issue is whether her use of the vehicle was of benefit to her employer. Of this there 
can be no question as the City limits, by ordinance, the availability of take home 
vehicles to those employees whose use of such a vehicle is of benefit to the City. 
As noted in Chapter 2.54.030 of the Salt Lake City Code: 
A. No motor vehicle owned by the City may be 
taken home by any city employee except under the 
following circumstances: 
1. Written permission is granted by the 
mayor or the mayor's designee on a 
demonstrated need for such a vehicle to be 
taken home to serve the public interest. 
Such a demonstrated need shall be deemed 
to exist for the following employees: 
(b) Employees who are subject to 
twenty-four hour call; 
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As the City acknowledges that it benefits from providing transportation to 
employees subject to day or night recall to duty, both prongs of the exception to the 
coming and going rule are satisfied in this case. 
Additionally, while the City has asserted that it had no control over 
officer Ross in her operation of its vehicle, this is not true. Under the City's rules 
for the take home car program, officer Ross was subject to strict requirements 
relating to the use of the patrol vehicle. In particular, she was forbidden from using 
the vehicle for any purpose outside of Salt Lake County except for "official business 
only, except going to-and-from Salt Lake County." See Addendum at 033-02-00.00 
A.5(2). She was also required to carry specified equipment at all times and to 
"keep the police radio on and, if necessary, be available to respond to emergency 
calls . . . " Id. at C. 3 & 7. These restrictions demonstrate that officer Ross 
remained subject to the City's control at all times while driving to and from work in 
the City's patrol vehicle, enhancing the conclusion that her travel was within the 
course of her employment. An employer is vicariously liable for an employee's 
negligence when "the employee is acting for the benefit of the employer and under 
[its] control." Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.. 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 
1989). 
It is not surprising, in light of the recognized principles applicable to the 
coming and going rule, that Courts across the country have recognized that police 
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officers traveling to and from work in department provided vehicles are acting 
within the course of their employment. 
For example, in Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't. 877 P.2d 1032 
(Nev. 1994), the Nevada Supreme Court held that an undercover officer was acting 
with the course and scope of his employment when driving home in a police owned 
vehicle from a restaurant where he had been meeting with other officers to report on 
his activities and to plan upcoming activities. The Court held that his operation of 
the police car, in which he could be summoned by the radio, conferred a benefit 
upon his employer and constituted an exception to the going and coming rule. 
The Court also noted that because a police officer can be "called" to duty 
by the mere happening of events in her presence, she is essentially always on duty, 
at least when operating a police vehicle. In fact, in Collier v. County of Nassau. 
362 N.Y.S.2d 52 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1974), the Court held that because officers 
are on call twenty-four (24) hours a day, use of a department owned vehicle in 
which they can be summoned places officers under employer control while driving 
to and from work, which directly benefits the employer and renders travel as within 
the course and scope of employment. 
In Medina v. Fuller. 971 P.2d 851 (N.M. App. 1998), an officer was 
held to be acting within the scope of her employment while driving home in her 
assigned, unmarked police car. 
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Defendant was a police officer. Part of the duties of 
police officers is to respond to calls while in their 
vehicles. The Sheriff's Department policy provided 
Defendant with a vehicle expressly to facilitate this 
duty. The policy established a certain degree of 
control over Defendant's use of the vehicle in 
question. 
971P.2dat857. 
It is undisputed in this case that City policy required Officer Ross to abide 
by specific requirements for operating her police vehicle, including having specified 
equipment in the vehicle and monitoring the radio while driving. These types of 
regulations covering the operation of a police vehicle while off duty have been held 
to make any operation of the vehicle within the course and scope of employment, 
even travel on a personal errand. 
In Montgomery County. Maryland v. Wade, 690 A.2d 990 (Md. App. 
1997), the Court held that an officer operating her patrol vehicle while on her way 
to her mother's home, with her grandmother as a passenger in the vehicle, was 
acting with the scope of her employment. The Court noted that the officer was 
driving her personal patrol vehicle (PPV) pursuant to a county established program, 
which 
program places very stringent procedural and 
operational regulations upon those who are assigned a 
vehicle. In operation thereof, the off-duty officer 
must carry a handgun, handcuffs, and departmental 
credentials, and equip the PPV with the items such as 
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flares, a fire extinguisher, a nightstick, a tactical duty 
helmet, and a traffic vest and gloves. They must 
monitor the police radio . . . 
690A.2dat992. 
These requirements are very similar to those of the City's take-home car 
program. These requirements, the court held, were enough to make her use of the 
vehicle, for any purpose permitted under the policy, a part of the officer's 
employment duties. 
The department. . . conditioned the use of the PPVs 
upon adherence to a stringent set of guidelines, which 
required, inter alia, that participating officers equip 
the vehicles with specified items, monitor the police 
radio, and "respond to incidents or calls for service." 
These guidelines, in essence, outline additional 
responsibilities by which participating officers are to 
abide upon penalty of, at a minimum, expulsion from 
the program. Any time Officer Wade placed the 
vehicle in operation while she was not on scheduled 
duty, she was bound to act within those guidelines. 
Taking this view, she may, therefore, properly be 
considered to have been operating the PPV under the 
auspices of the department at the time of the accident, 
and, thereby with the course of her employment. 
690 A.2d at 995-96. 
Indeed, in City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm'n. 614 N.E.2d 478 (111. 
App. 1993), the Court held that operation of a police vehicle while monitoring the 
radio is itself sufficient to make that activity within the course of employment. See 
also. Johnson v. Dufrene. 433 So.2d 1109 (La. App. 1983) (officer provided 
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vehicle so he could be contacted by radio made operation of vehicle within course 
and scope of employment). 
The unifying fact of each of the decisions cited by the City for non-
liability in the case of a police officer traveling to or from work is that the trip was 
being made in the officer's personal vehicle. Indeed, in DeJesus v. New York State 
Police. 467 N.Y.S.2d 916 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1983), the Court expressly noted 
that use of the officer's personal vehicle was the fact which distinguished the case 
from Collier, supra, where the Court 
held that where the employer's vehicle had been used 
by the employee over a period of time with the 
employer's consent and for the employer's benefit, 
the operation of the vehicle was directly related to the 
employment and that any injury occurring during 
such operation arises out of and in the course of 
employment. 
417 N.Y.S.2d at 917. (emphasis added.) 
POINT II. OFFICER ROSS WAS ON A SPECIAL ERRAND WHEN 
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND WAS, THEREFORE, 
ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF 
HER EMPLOYMENT. 
An alternative ground upon which this Court could affirm the judgment of 
the court below is that, based upon the undisputed facts, officer Ross was within the 
course of her employment under a second exception to the going and coming rule, 
the "special errand" exception. In State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n. 685 
10 
P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984), this Court held that an employee traveling from her home 
to a training course she had been authorized to attend by her employer was within 
the course and scope of her employment when injured in a car accident. This Court 
quoted with favor a statement that 
when [an] employee engages in a special activity 
which is within the course of his employment, and 
which is reasonably undertaken at the request or 
invitation of the employer, any injury suffered while 
traveling to and from the place of such activity is also 
within the course of employment. . . 
685 P.2d at 1054. 
Attendance at work related meetings while off duty has been found to 
constitute a special errand. See, e.g., Mikkelson v. N.L. Industries. 370 A.2d 5 
(N.J. 1977) (attending a union meeting called for a vote on ratifying a contract with 
employer constitutes a special errand). See also. Perez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals 
Bd.. 152 Cal. App.3d 60 (Cal. App. 1984) (same). 
In its opening brief, the city mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals 
decision in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n. 901 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1995), by 
contending that an employee was determined not to be on a special errand because 
"[the employee] was not being compensated for his time spent traveling between his 
home and [the employer's] office. The accident did not occur on [the employer's] 
premises, nor did [the employee's] duties require him to be at the place where the 
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accident occurred." Appellant's Brief at pg. 32. The City refers to this list as 
"special errand" factors. This contention is entirely inaccurate. The quoted 
language from VanLeeuwen is not of the elements necessary for finding of a special 
errand but rather a series of independent grounds for determining that an 
employee's activities were within the course of his employment. In point of fact, 
there was no contention made in VanLeeuwen that the employee was on a special 
errand and the City's suggestion that the quoted language represents "factors" to 
consider in determining if a particular trip was part of a special errand reflects 
either a serious misunderstanding of the doctrine or an attempt to confuse this Court 
into consideration of extraneous matters. As this Court recently noted, none of 
these "factors" play any role in determining if an employee is on a special errand. 
Travel is a special errand 
if the travel can be deemed "an act outside an 
employee's regular duties which is undertaken in 
good faith to advance the employer's interest, 
whether or not the employee's own assigned work is 
thereby furthered." 
Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
Officer Ross' trip to attend a meeting on her day off meets this test. 
Furthermore, the fact that the field training officers meet together once every three 
weeks does not convert such a meeting into a regular duty. Attendance at regularly 
scheduled meetings held while an employee would otherwise be off duty has been 
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held to be a special errand. For example, in McGintv v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd.. 
266 Cal. App. 2d 280 (Cal. App. 1968), the Court held that an employee required to 
attend a mandatory, after hours, monthly sales meeting was on a special errand when 
returning home from such a meeting. 
If the employee undertakes a trip for her employer's benefit which is not a 
part of her routine duties, that trip is a special errand. For example, in Schreifer v. 
Industrial Ace. Com.. 391 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1964), the California Supreme Court held 
that a deputy sheriff who was scheduled to work from 7:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. but who 
was called at home and received an order to report to work "as soon as possible" after 
1:00 p.m. was on a special errand when driving to work. See, also. Kvle v. Greene 
High School. 226 N.W. 71 (la. 1929) (janitor called to work at irregular hour); Los 
Angeles Jewish Community Council v. Industrial Ace. Com.. 209 P.2d 991 (Cal. App. 
1949) (Rabbi called in early for duties was on special errand when driving to work). 
Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber. 465 P.2d 174 (Utah 1970), is not to the 
contrary. The Lundberg decision simply indicates that if attendance at a meeting on a 
normal work day at the employee's normal place of business is a typical part of the 
employee's duties, the attendance at that meeting is simply part of the employee's usual 
work duty and he remains subject to the going and coming rule. Where, as in this 
case, the meeting is an infrequent occurrence and is called for a day the employee is not 
otherwise scheduled to work, travel to such a meeting constitutes a special errand and 
the City has offered no legal authority to the contrary. 
13 
POINT III. THE CITY'S RELIANCE ON THE BIRKNER TEST IS IN 
ERROR AS THAT TEST HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE 
FACTS OF THE CASE. 
The City's reliance upon the test for course of employment set forth in 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), is entirely misplaced. 
Birkner, while establishing a framework for evaluating whether particular conduct is 
within an employee's scope of employment, says nothing about the going and coming 
rule or its exceptions. It would only have application to the "work" from which the 
employee was coming or to which she was going. As the City has always admitted that 
officer Ross' actual attendance at the Field Training Officer meeting was clearly within 
the scope of her employment, her journey home from that work was from an activity 
that meets the test set forth in Birkner. The issue is not whether she was driving home 
from performing a duty that was within her scope of employment but whether the 
journey itself satisfies one or more of the exceptions to the general rule that traveling to 
or from work isn't within the scope of employment. As the City has always 
acknowledged that the meeting itself was a part of officer Ross' employment duties, the 
test articulated in Birkner is met in this case and the remaining question is limited to 
whether travel from work within the scope of employment is also within the scope of 
employment. Birkner simply does not speak to this question and, therefore, offers no 
guidance on the only issue presented by this appeal. 
That this is true can be seen by the fact that none of the "coming and going" 
cases ever discuss the Birkner criteria and always involve employees who are simply 
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driving to or from work when injured or causing injury to others. Application of the 
coming and going rule and its exceptions presupposes that the journey in question is to 
or from work, a presupposition which the City has acknowledged is true in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs in this action suffered severe personal injuries when their 
vehicle was struck by a Salt Lake City police officer returning to her home from a 
meeting scheduled by her employer, on her day off, in a patrol vehicle made available 
for her use by her employer. The officer was acting within the course of her 
employment both because she was using employer furnished transportation and because 
she was on a special errand. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed and the 
case remanded for trial on the issue of damages. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of £ £ , 2002. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. Pavid Eckersley gy' 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ADDENDUM 
D33-00-Q0.00 POLICE VEHICLES 
D33-01-00.00 OPERATION AND USE OF DEPARTMENT VEHICLES 
033-01-01.00 DRIVING HABITS 
changed 11/97 Employees shall operate police vehicles in a careful and prudent manner and shall set a 
proper example in driving habits. 
Changed 9/24/99 
D33-02-00.00 TAKE HOME CAR PROGRAM 
A. Program Requirements 
1. Vehicle assignment 
All employees assigned a police vehicle under this program will submit 
an AGREEMENT FOR USE OF POLICE VEHICLE form to the Chief 
of Police. This form shall act as an agreement between the employee and 
the Department authorizing the vehicle's use and providing for personal 
use reimbursement if required. 
Added 9/24/99 All employees assigned a Department vehicle must complete an updated 
AGREEMENT FOR USE OF POUCE VEHICLE whenever they have a 
change of addresses or assigned vehicle. Forms can be obtained at the 
Technical Support Depot on the second floor. The completed agreement 
shall be returned to Technical Support. This procedure is to assure that 
the correct fee is being deducted from the employee's pay. 
The authorization may be revoked at any time by the Chief of Police in 
the best interest of the City or if the employee fails to comply with 
requirements or Departmental rules and regulations. An injured 
employee on light duty must forfeit the police vehicle upon request of the 
Chief of Police. An unmarked vehicle may be provided, if possible. 
a. Assigned vehicles will stay with the originally issued employee 
until they are replaced with a new vehicle. 
b . Exceptions are: 
1. Transfer from a uniform to plainclothes division or vice 
versa. In this case, officers coming into the respective 
division will be assigned any available vehicle as their 
take-home vehicle. 
2. Review of traffic accidents or other damage that totally 
destroys a vehicle will be based on a review of the case or 
facts of the incident by the Chief of Police. Based on the 
findings of that review, either a new or fleet vehicle will 
be issued to the employee. 
hanged n/97 c. Loaner vehicles, both marked and unmarked, are maintained and 
coordinated via the Technical Support Depot and the repair shop. 
d. Officers assigned to a uniform division on a temporary 
assignment to a plainclothes assignment will leave their regularly 
assigned fleet vehicle with their respective division. Upon return 
to the permanent uniform assignment, the regularly assigned take-
home vehicle will be available to the original officer. 
unged n/97 1. Exceptions to the above are Larceny and fugitive 
detectives, who will retain their marked units while 
assigned as Larceny officers. 
e. The Chief of Police will authorize any other exception. 
2. Residency Requirements 
mnged 11/97 a. Assignment of take-home police vehicles shall be determined by 
the location of the employee's residence. To participate in the 
Take Home Car program as described in policies set forth in the 
Salt Lake City Police Policy Manual and the Salt Lake City 
Corporation Policies and Procedures, the employee must live 
within the boundaries of Salt Lake, Utah, Davis, Summit and 
Tooele counties. 
b. Employees who reside in locations outside of Salt Lake, Utah, 
Davis, Summit and Tooele counties, and who have received 
approval through a special agreement between the employee and 
the Chief of Police, may have take-home use of the police 
vehicle; however, they must meet any requirements concerning 
use and security of the vehicle. 
3 . Forfeiture of Participation 
Any employee who chooses to change the location of their residence to 
anywhere outside the established limits of Salt Lake, Utah, Davis, 
Summit and Tooele counties will forfeit participation in the Take Home 
Car program unless a special agreement is entered into between the 
employee and the Chief as provided in subparagraph 2 above. 
4. Exceptions 
This policy shall apply to all police personnel who are issued a vehicle 
unless the Chief of Police otherwise grants express permission. 
mged 8/92 5. Vehicle Use Restrictions 
1. Off-duty use will be reasonable and incidental to domestic usage 
and will not include operation by anyone other than the employee. 
Off-duty use of the vehicles within the established boundaries of 
Salt Lake County shall be restricted as provided in subparagraphs 
C and D of this policy. 
2. Use of the vehicle outside the Salt Lake County limits shall be 
restricted to use for official business only, except going to-and-
from Salt Lake County. 
C. Rules and Regulations 
1. Each employee shall be responsible for the care of an assigned police 
vehicle. 
2. Division/Unit Commanders shall make monthly inspections of vehicles 
assigned to their divisions, which will include off-duty use and activity, 
to ensure that employees are complying wjth the intent of this policy. 
Documentation will be forwarded to the Bureau Commanders on a 
quarterly basis. 
mged I 1/97 3. Officers shall carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at 
all times: 
mged 9/24/99 
a. 
B 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g-
An authorized gun 
Police Radio 
Proper identification 
A flashlight 
Ticket books 
Necessary report forms 
Flares 
led 11/97 4. Civilian employees will carry the following equipment with them in the 
vehicle at all times. 
a. Proper identification 
b. A flashlight 
c. Flares 
5. Window decals, ornaments hanging from the windshield mirror, bumper 
stickers or other signs, pictures or ornaments visible to the public and 
attached to a police vehicle are prohibited. The employee's 
Division/Unit Commander must specifically approve any deviation from 
this policy. 
anged 9/24/99 6. When off duty, employees may wear any dress appropriate to their 
activities. If the dress is not appropriate to represent the Department in 
public contact, the utility uniform may be used. 
7. When using the vehicle, off-duty employees must keep the police radio 
on and, if necessary, be available to respond to emergency calls. If in the 
vicinity, the officer should respond to in-progress crimes or other major 
calls. The officer shall notify the dispatcher of the response and should 
continue to assist until relieved or until the problem is concluded. 
Passengers should not be in police vehicles while responding to 
emergencies or dangerous calls. They should be left in a safe place prior 
to arrival at the scene. 
8. If an off-duty officer responds to a dispatched call or performs other 
police services as discussed in paragraph 6 above, the officer will be 
compensated pursuant to the overtime policy consistent with the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 
9. Except when responding to an emergency call, off-duty employees shall 
park police vehicles legally and will be responsible for any citation 
received. 
10. Unattended vehicles will be locked at all times. 
11. City-owned vehicles will not be utilized for carrying heavy or excessive 
loads and will not have objects protruding from the trunks or windows. 
12. Under no circumstances will police vehicles be utilized by employees or 
guest passengers who have consumed alcoholic beverages within the 
previous four hours. 
13. Officers shall secure all weapons while the vehicle is unattended. All 
weapons will be removed from the vehicle while it is being serviced. 
* 11/97 14. Employees may use the vehicle to drive to-and-from secondary 
employment within Salt Lake County limits. 
15. Employees who are on vacation leave in excess of three days, or who are 
suspended from duty shall coordinate with their Division/Unit 
Commander for the care and security of their assigned vehicle until their 
return to work. 
16. All Department employees shall use the seat belts installed by the vehicle 
manufacturer in a properly adjusted and securely fastened manner when 
operating or riding in any Department vehicle. 
The driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring compliance with 
State Law (41-6-182 U.C.A.), by all occupants of the vehicle they are 
operating. Approved child safety restraints shall be used for all children 
of age, size or weight, for which such restraints are prescribed by law. 
Ref. 41-6-148.20 U.C.A. 
The above applies any time the Department vehicle is being operated 
either on or off duty. 
No person shall modify, remove, deactivate or otherwise tamper with the 
vehicle seat belts except for vehicle maintenance and repair, or without 
the express written authorization of die Chief of Police. 
Any person(s) in custody and being transported in a Department vehicle, 
is required to be secured in the vehicle by the use of the seat belt that is 
provided by the vehicle manufacturer. 
Officers arriving at a call or making a traffic stop, may remove the seat 
belt for a quick vehicle exit, just prior to stopping. Caution should be 
exercised to ensure that during a traffic stop the violator is indeed 
stopping before the seat belt is removed. 
D. Maintenance Requirements 
Employees are responsible for the appearance and cleanliness of their vehicles, 
both interior and exterior. Employees assigned take-home vehicles will wash, 
vacuum, and clean their vehicles on duty. 
Employees are also fully responsible for the general maintenance and proper 
care of their vehicles and will: 
1. Use fuel, lubricants or additives in the vehicle that are provided by the 
City or approved by the Department. 
2. Only use the City shops or other facility authorized by the Department 
for repairs. 
3. Obtain express written permission from the Chief of Police for the 
addition or deletion of auxiliary equipment to police vehicles. Auxiliary 
equipment may include, but is not limited to, scanners, stereos, etc. The 
Installation must be approved by the Department Fleet Coordinator prior 
to the installation. 
a. Written requests should be submitted through the chain of 
command to the Division/Unit Commander for forwarding to the 
Department Fleet Coordinator. After review by the Department 
Fleet Coordinator, recommendation as to the feasibility of such 
requested installation will be made to the Bureau Commander. 
The Bureau Commander will present the request to the Chief of 
Police and report the decision back to the Division/Unit 
Commander and Department Fleet Coordinator. 
b. It is the responsibility of the employee to contact the Department 
Fleet Coordinator and complete the Agreement for Alteration of a 
Police Vehicle form. 
c. Any such equipment must be purchased, installed and maintained 
at the employee's personal expense. The employee as per the 
agreement must retain any standard equipment removed from the 
vehicle. 
d. When the vehicle is no longer assigned to the employee, it must 
be restored to a condition acceptable to Fleet Management. The 
City shops will then complete ths final disposition portion of the 
agreement form. The form will be returned to the Department 
Fleet Coordinator. 
33-03-00.00 FLEET/ LOANER VEHICLES - EMPLOYEES NOT TAKING PART IN THE TAKE HOME CAR 
PROGRAM AND TEMPORARY USE VEHICLES 
ided 9.24.99 A. FLEET VEHICLES 
The Department has established a number of "fleet" cars that are to be available 
at the Public Safety Building for employees and other eligible employees 
electing not to participate in the Take Home Car Program. These vehicles are 
available for checkout at the Technical Support Depot for the employee's use 
during their duty shift. Fleet cars are designated as non-smoking vehicles and 
the employees are responsible for leaving fleet cars clean, fueled and ready for 
the next shift. 
